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Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, was initially a neuroscientist but abandoned
neuroscience completely after he made a last attempt to link both in his writing, “Project
of a Scientiﬁc Psychology,” in 1895. The reasons for his subsequent disregard of the brain
remain unclear though. I here argue that one central reason may be that the approach
to the brain during his time was simply not appealing to Freud. More speciﬁcally, Freud
was interested in revealing the psychological predispositions of psychodynamic processes.
However, he was not so much focused on the actual psychological functions themselves
which though were the prime focus of the neuroscience at his time and also in current Cog-
nitive Neuroscience. Instead, he probably would have been more interested in the brain’s
resting state and its constitution of a spatiotemporal structure. I here assume that the
resting state activity constitutes a statistically based virtual structure extending and linking
the different discrete points in time and space within the brain. That in turn may serve as
template, schemata, or grid for all subsequent neural processing during stimulus-induced
activity. As such the resting state’ spatiotemporal structure may serve as the neural pre-
disposition of what Freud described as “psychological structure.” Hence, Freud and also
current neuropsychoanalysis may want to focus more on neural predispositions, the neces-
sary non-sufﬁcient conditions, rather than the neural correlates, i.e., sufﬁcient, conditions
of psychodynamic processes.
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THE SEARCH FOR THE LINKAGE BETWEEN
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE – FREUD AND THE
BRAIN
Sigmund Freud – a neuroscientist? Often forgotten, Sigmund
Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, was trained initially as a
neuroanatomist and investigated nerve cells and the exact lesion
localization of speech disorders like aphasia. His early neuroscien-
tiﬁc origins were though overshadowed and later even completely
replaced by his focus on exclusively psychodynamic issues like
the ego, our dreams, the unconscious. There is one speciﬁc node
point in his own writings where his search for psychodynamic
mechanisms converges with the quest for corresponding neuronal
mechanisms in the brain. This is his famous 1895 writing on a
“Project for a Scientiﬁc Psychology”where he tries to link neuronal
mechanisms to psychodynamic concepts (see part two for details).
Though he here attempts to link speciﬁc neuronal mechanisms to
his psychodynamic concepts, Freud later considered his ﬁrst neu-
ropsychoanalytic endeavor a failure and consequently never did
publish the manuscript during his life time (Freud, 1895).
After having its publication,Freud’s“Project for a Scientiﬁc Psy-
chology”has stirredmuch discussion about whether psychoanaly-
sis can in principle be linked to neuroscience or not (see Brook,
1998; Levins, 2003; Peled, 2008; Northoff, 2011).Most recently, his
1895 Project writing has been taken as evidence to support the idea
that psychoanalysis can indeed be linked to neuroscience which
has led to the birth of a novel discipline, neuropsychoanalysis
(see Weinstein and Kahn, 1956; Kandel, 1998; Solms et al., 1998;
Solms and Solms-Kaplan, 2000; Solms and Turnbull, 2002; Fon-
agy, 2003; Schore, 2003; Mancia, 2004, 2006a,b; Solms, 2004;
Northoff et al., 2007a; Feinberg, 2009; Northoff, 2011). Neuropsy-
choanalysis, most broadly deﬁned, aims to link psychodynamic
concepts and neuroscientiﬁc mechanisms and thus to integrate
psyche and brain. However, as with any peculiar birth, the rather
long pregnancy and consecutively painful delivery of the disci-
pline of neuropsychoanalysis after its initial conception in 1895
has stirred much controversy; this concerns especially how the
novel infant shall be properly taken care of with proponents and
opponent being very much divided about the kind of remedy for
the gestational complications.
Neuropsychoanalysis focuses predominantly on linking psy-
chodynamic concepts like dreams, the unconscious, ego/self, to
speciﬁc psychological, e.g., cognitive and affective functions,which
in turn may be localized in particular brain regions (see below for
further details). One focus has been on the unconscious and its
relation to memories (see Kandel, 1998; Mancia, 2004, 2006a,b)
while others searched for neuronal mechanisms underlying dri-
ves (Solms, 1996; Panksepp, 1998; Fonagy, 2003), dreams (Solms,
1997, 2000; Solms and Turnbull, 2002; Mancia, 2004; Hobson,
2009; Northoff, 2011), the ego (Northoff, 2007; Carhart-Harris
and Friston, 2010), primary and secondary processes (Carhart-
Harris and Friston, 2010), and defensemechanisms (Fonagy, 2003;
Northoff and Boeker, 2006; Northoff et al., 2007a; Feinberg, 2011;
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Northoff, 2011). Since these neuropsychoanalytic investigations
focus on searching for the brain regions whose neural activity
correlates with the psychodynamic concept in question, one may
want to speakof the“neural correlates”of psychodynamic concepts
(see below for details).
What would have Freud said to neuropsychoanalysis?Would he
have embraced the newborn with the name neuropsychoanalysis?
Or would he have left the novel infant alone in the very same way
he rejected and abandoned his 1895 writing that, following him,
was supposed to die a silent death in the graveyard of unpublished
writings?We do not know and if at all we can only speculate.What
we know though (at least partially) is why Freud abandoned his
initial neuropsychoanalytic attempts. He considered the knowl-
edge of the brain and thus the neuroscience at his time to be not
as sufﬁciently mature as to allow for linking neuronal mechanisms
and psychodynamic concepts.
How about the situation now? Is our current knowledge and
insight into the brain’s neuronal mechanisms sufﬁcient to allow
for what had eluded Freud, the link between neuronal mech-
anisms and psychodynamic concepts? Leading proponents like
Solms (2004) and Panksepp (1998) do indeed consider neuropsy-
choanalysis as the continuation and completion of Freud’s 1895
project (see also Pugh, 2006 as well as Ellenberger, 1970) and,more
generally, of his endeavor to establish a scientiﬁcally based psychol-
ogy of the human mind. Is neuropsychoanalysis thus nothing but
a mere continuation and completion of Freud’s aim to develop a
scientiﬁc psychology of the mind which is now merely extended
from the psyche to the brain? Let us turn ﬁnally to the brain itself
and see whether neuropsychoanalysis can indeed overcome the
deﬁcits in the knowledge of the brain Freud diagnosed at his time.
Why did Freud abandon the brain and neuroscience completely
after 1895?What we do know are the reasons Freud gave for aban-
doning his initial neuropsychoanalytic attempt, the “Project.” He
considered the neuroscience of his time to be insufﬁcientlymature
to allow for the linking of neuronal mechanisms and psychody-
namic concepts. Besides the lack of knowledge, there may though
be a more basic and principle reason namely how to approach
the brain. Put in a nutshell, Freud’s Project writing suggest an
approach to the brain as an intrinsically active and dynamic organ
rather than the brain being passive and static with its function
being completely determined in a reﬂexive way. However, he could
not ﬁnd such a dynamic and active approach to the brain at this
time and subsequently abandoned neuroscience. Instead, he dedi-
cated himself completely to the psychic apparatus which he asked
as active and dynamic when for instance developing his psychical
topography, i.e., topological structure.
THE SEARCH FOR NEUROPSYCHODYNAMICS – FUNCTION-
AND LOCALIZATION-BASED APPROACH TO THE BRAIN
Current neuropsychoanalysis heavily relies and draws on recent
developments in Cognitive, Affective, or Social Neuroscience (see
Panksepp, 1998; Gazzaniga et al., 2008). For instance, differ-
ent cognitive functions like attention, working memory, episodic
memory, are taken as initial starting points and are then related
to supposedly corresponding concepts like memory or dreams
within the psychodynamic context (see for instance, Carhart-
Harris and Friston, 2010, and Mancia, 2006a,b for such an
approach). While others like Panksepp and Solms pursue a more
affective-based approach to neuropsychoanalysis that relies on
the intrinsic affective functions and their corresponding sub-
cortical neural substrates (Panksepp, 1998; Solms and Turnbull,
2002). This has lead to the discussion of the neuronal mech-
anisms underlying psychodynamic concepts like introjections,
narcissism, self-objects, drives (see Solms, 2004; Northoff et al.,
2007a; Northoff and Panksepp, 2008; Northoff, 2011). One may
consecutively want to speak here of what I call a “function-based
approach” as the ﬁrst hallmark of current neuropsychoanalytic
approaches.
How can such function-based approach be related to the brain?
Broadly speaking, Cognitive,Affective, or Social Neuroscience aim
to link cognitive, affective, or social psychological functions to the
brain andmore speciﬁcally to the neural activity in speciﬁc regions
of the brain. For instance, cognitive functions like working mem-
ory, attention, have been associated with the neural activity in
speciﬁc cortical regions like the lateral prefrontal cortex and the
parietal cortex (Gazzaniga et al., 2008). While affective and basic
social functions are more associated with neural activity in sub-
cortical regions like the tectum, the periaqueductal gray (PAG),
the dorsomedial thalamus, the colliculi (see Damasio, 1995, 2000;
Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp and Northoff, 2009). Following the
roadmaps of its guiding disciplines, Neuropsychoanalysis aims to
link speciﬁc psychodynamic mechanisms to the neuronal activity
in particular regions of the brain.
One of the main frontrunners of such approach was Mark
Solms. He observed particular psychodynamic changes in his neu-
rosurgical patients who suffered from speciﬁc lesions in their
brains. Inferring from the pathological to the healthy, this allowed
him to link psychodynamic mechanisms to speciﬁc brain regions
(Solms and Solms-Kaplan, 2000; Solms and Turnbull, 2002) and
to consecutively establish the discipline of neuropsychoanaly-
sis. Relying on his observations in neurosurgical patients, he for
instance argues that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC)
may be crucial in constituting the ego (or self; see chapter three in
part three for detailed discussion) while the parietal cortex may be
central in constituting the own body as ﬁrst self-object (see Solms,
1999). This approachhas recently been extended also to the healthy
brain so that neuropsychoanalysis can be characterized by what I
call a “localization-based approach” as it is the second hallmark
feature.
Does neuropsychoanalysis in this sense, as characterized by
the two hallmark features of a function- and localization-based
approach, can account for what had eluded Freud in his early 1895
writing? Can the function- and localization-based approach to
the brain in current neuropsychoanalysis make up for the deﬁcits
in our knowledge of the brain that Freud diagnosed at his time?
Would such a function- and localization-based approach have led
Freud to reverse his decision to abandon and abort his 1895 writ-
ing? To decide these questions, we have to turn back to Freud
himself and see how he would have approached the brain if he
only could.
THE SEARCH FOR THE PSYCHIC
APPARATUS – PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURE AND
ORGANIZATION
How did Freud approach psychological functions? How did he
relate them to what he called the “psychic apparatus?” Freud
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listened to his patients and investigated their mental contents
which he then associated with speciﬁc psychological functions.
The psychological functions in turn were assumed tomirror a spe-
ciﬁc psychodynamicmechanism. For instance, the dreams showed
his patient’s mental contents to be predominantly sexual which
otherwise,outsidedreams,couldnot surface. Fromthat he inferred
a speciﬁc psychologicalmechanism, repression, that repressed sex-
ual contents during the day but let them surface in the night’s
dreams.
What does Freud presuppose here? He starts with observations
of mental contents as for instance sexual desire and attributes a
speciﬁc meaning to them in that they are supposed to express
something speciﬁc about the person itself. Now the crucial step
comes. He infers from the mental content and its personal rele-
vance a speciﬁc psychological function, repression. What does he
presuppose here? He presupposes that the mental content and its
speciﬁc meaning are possible only on the basis of the speciﬁc psy-
chological function of repression. One may consequently want to
speak of a “function-based approach” in Freud.
Is there any difference between the “function-based approach”
in the context of Cognitive, Affective and Social Neuroscience and
the one presupposed by Freud? In contrast to Freud, Cognitive,
Affective and Social Neuroscience do not start with speciﬁc indi-
viduallymeaningful contents that are subjective. Instead, they start
with certain objective behaviors as for instance social interaction,
cognitions, or emotions. Despite such difference in the starting
point, the inference to psychological functions is the same. In
the same way that Cognitive, Social, and Affective Neuroscience
infer speciﬁc psychological functions to account for the observed
behavior, Freud infers his psychological functions from themental
contents he observed. One may consequently speak in both cases
of a “function-based approach” (see below for a critical discussion
though).
There is even further convergence.Many of the cognitive, affec-
tive, and social functions investigated in Cognitive, Affective, and
Social Neuroscience are related these days to the psychological
functions Freud described. For instance, the cognitive function of
memory and especially autobiographical memory may be closely
related to Freud’s psychological function of repression (Kan-
del, 1998; Mancia, 2006a,b). Freud’s “function-based approach”
may consecutively converge with the one presupposed in current
Cognitive, Affective, and Social Neuroscience.
Does convergence of both function-based approaches provide
a common platform to make the second step, the one to the brain?
If the cognitive, affective, and social functions can be localized in
speciﬁc regions of the brain, the respectively associated psycho-
logical functions as described by Freud must be related to exactly
these brain regions. The“localization-based approach”would then
be seen as the natural extension of Freud’s psychological functions
to the brain. This is, as indicated above, the way Mark Solms and
Jaak Panksepp see it.
However, Freud did not go this way. He did not extend and
complement his function-based approach by a localization-based
approach. Why? Let us listen to Freud himself: “Every attempt to
discover a localization of mental processes. . . has miscarried com-
pletely. The same fate would await any theory that attempted to
recognize the anatomical position of the system (consciousness) –
as being in the cortex, and to localize the unconscious processes
in the subcortical parts of the brain. There is a hiatus which at
present cannot be ﬁlled, nor is it one of the tasks of psychology to
ﬁll it. Our psychical topography has for the present nothing to do
with anatomy.” (Freud, 1915)
Why was Freud so skeptical about the localization of his psy-
chological functions? Is it only because he lacked the psychological
inventory of Cognitive, Affective, and Social Neuroscience we are
fortunate to have these days? This is the positionMark Solms, Jaak
Panksepp, andmany proponents of Neuropsychoanalysis take. But
let us go back to Freud himself and see how his focus shifted
especially after his 1895 writing.
After his 1895 writing, Freud abandoned the reference to the
brain completely and focused exclusively on psychological func-
tions. He however went one step further beyond mere psycho-
logical functions. He aimed to put the assumed psychological
functions into a larger psychological context. This context refers
to psychological structure and organization rather than to speciﬁc
psychological contents as yielded by particular psychological con-
tents. For instance, he introduced the tripartite structure of the
psychic apparatus with its division between Id, Ego, and Superego.
His focus thus goes beyond mere psychological functions to their
underlying psychological structure and organization. Unlike Cog-
nitive,Affective, and SocialNeuroscience,he does not complement
his function-based approach by a localization-based approach.
Instead, he here departs taking another direction, the one of psy-
chological structure and organization. I consecutively speak of
what I call “structure-based approach” in Freud.
How are psychological structure and organization related to
psychological functions? Psychological structure and organiza-
tion enable and predispose speciﬁc psychological functions as for
instance the egomakes possible the repression of sexual desire. Let
us describe the difference between psychological functions and
structure/organization in the terms of necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions. Psychological functions are assumed to correlate with
the mental contents (or the behavior) in question; the former is
thus a sufﬁcient condition of the latter. This is different in the
case of psychological structure and organization. The ego is not
assumed to correlate with speciﬁc mental contents and can there-
fore not be regarded a sufﬁcient condition. However, it is assumed
to make ﬁrst and foremost possible all kinds of mental contents.
Without ego, there can be no mental contents at all. The ego is
thus a necessary but non-sufﬁcient condition of (possible) mental
contents.
Where does this leave us? Freud and current Cognitive, Affec-
tive, and Social Neuroscience seem to share the function-based
approach. While sharing the ﬁrst step, they though depart in the
subsequent step. Cognitive, Affective, and Social Neuroscience go
forward toward the brain when assuming a localization-based
approach. Freud though decided to go into another direction, the
direction of psychological structure and organization thereby pre-
supposing a structure-based approach. If we want to extend Freud
to the brain, we thus have to extend his structure-based approach
into a neural context. For that we may leave Freud and go back to
the neuroscience at his and our time.
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We have to be careful though. Freud did already pursue a
structure-based approach before he abandoned neuroscience and
switched completely to psychology and psychoanalysis. This is well
apparent in his early structural distinction between preconscious,
unconscious, and conscious. One may want to read his 1895 writ-
ing on the brain thus a the attempt to ﬁnd such structure in the
brain itself. Thismaywell correspond to his search and postulation
of the kind of dynamic mechanisms he suggested in his 1895 writ-
ing. Due to the limited knowledge of the brain at his time, he may
have felt it to be hopeless to ever link his structural approach on the
psychological level to corresponding neuronal structurewithin the
context of the brain. That though is mere speculation. I therefore
refrain from that and characterize our current knowledge about
the brain and its neuronal structure.
THE SEARCH FOR THE BRAIN – INTRINSIC VERSUS
EXTRINSIC VIEWS
Freud focused on the structure and organization of the psychic
apparatus, i.e., its psychological structure and organization. How
can we now put what he described as psychological structure and
organization into the neural context of the brain? One may be
inclined to argue that we simply have to look for what may be
described as “neural structure”of the brain itself. How can we ﬁnd
the brain’s neural structure? Apparently it does not seem to consist
in the various psychological functions and their respectively asso-
ciated regions investigated in current neuroscience. Analogous to
the psychic apparatus in Freud’s case, the brain itself may show
an intrinsic neural structure independent of the kind of extrin-
sic information, i.e., stimuli associated with particular events or
objects, processed in the brain’s various regions and their respec-
tive functions. This shifts the focus to the intrinsic activity of the
brain, what is often called resting state activity, and the kind of
neural structure it constitutes.
At the beginning of neuroscience around the turn of the twenti-
eth century,different views of the brain emerged.One view favored
by the British neurologist Sir Charles Sherrington (1857–1952)
assumed the brain and more speciﬁcally the spinal cord to be pri-
marily reﬂexive. Reﬂexivemeans that the brain reacts in predeﬁned
and automatic ways to stimuli from the outside world. Hence, the
extrinsic stimuli do almost completely and exclusively determine
the activity in the brain which is thus driven by the momentary
demandsof the extrinsic environment, i.e., the sensory inputs. This
means that what we as observers call “stimulus-induced activity”
can be completely and exclusively be traced back to the stimulus
itself implying, to put it in more general terms, that the “brain has
no say in what happens in the brain.” I call such a view of the
brain an “extrinsic view” because the brain is here not character-
ized by intrinsic features that by themselves determine what can
(and cannot) occur in the brain (see Figure 1A).
An alternative view thoughwas suggested byoneof his students,
T. Graham Brown. In contrast to his teacher, he suggested that the
brain’s activity, i.e., spinal cord and brain stem, is not primarily
driven by extrinsic stimuli from the environment but rather by
intrinsic activity within the spinal cord and the brain stem itself.
This means that stimulus-induced activity can no longer be com-
pletely and exclusively be traced back to the stimulus itself. Instead,
what we as observers describe as stimulus-induced activity must
FIGURE 1 | (A) Extrinsic view- brain as behavioral-cognitive reﬂex apparatus
(Sherrington, cognitive neuroscience). (B) Intrinsic view- brain as active
player in its neuronal activity (Brown, Lashley, Llinas, Shulman, Panksepp).
then be considered to be the hybrid result of a speciﬁc interaction
between the intrinsic activity and the stimulus. Hence, unlike the
extrinsic view of the brain, the brain itself and more speciﬁcally
its intrinsic features have a say in what happens in the brain –
I therefore speak here of an “intrinsic view” of the brain (see
Figure 1B).
Thedichotomybetween an intrinsic and an extrinsic viewof the
brain is preserved into our times and has recently, within the con-
text of functional brain imaging, seen a resurgence (see Raichle,
2009a). Let us start with the extrinsic view ﬁrst which is most
predominant in especially cognitive and social neuroscience. Cog-
nitive and social neuroscience employ speciﬁc experimental tasks
and associated stimuli to probe for neural activity changes within
the brain. The extrinsic cognitive stimuli can thereby be related
to neural activity in the brain. This has led to the view of a tight
relationship between the brain’s neural activity and the extrinsic
stimulus with the latter exclusively and sufﬁciently determining
the former.
Sherrington’s view of the brain as primarily reﬂexive with
regard to sensory and motor functions is here extended into the
domain of cognitive, affective, and social functions. Rather than
responding to sensory stimuli as in the case of Sherrington, the
brain now passively and automatically reacts in an almost reﬂexive
way to cognitive stimuli and demands from the environment. One
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may consequently want to speak of an extrinsic and cognitive view
of the brain. Hence, cognitive neuroscience and its more recent
siblings of affective and social neuroscience, all strongly relying on
functional imaging, thus presuppose an extrinsic rather than an
intrinsic view of the brain.
This extrinsic and cognitive view of the brain has however been
challenged recently by results from functional imaging itself which
has been the main tool to advocate the extrinsic approach to the
brain in cognitive neuroscience. Studies by Raichle et al. (2001)
showed that the brain is not only active when we stimulate it with
our extrinsic stimuli and observe the associated activity changes,
so-called stimulus-induced activity. Even when we rest without
any speciﬁc extrinsic stimulation,our brain is still active and shows
high resting state activity. This is for instance reﬂected in the fact
that our brain is energy-hungry even in the resting state. Though
comprising only 2% of the body’s mass, the resting awake brain
consumes 20% of the body’s total oxygen. Oxygen is essential for
any kind of neuronal activity and the abundant use of the body’s
oxygen during rest indicates that something must go in the brain
during rest (Raichle, 2009a,b).
What does the brain do with the huge amount of energy
(20% of the body’s energy) it apparently invests into its intrin-
sic activity? Part of this intrinsic energy the brain uses to process
extrinsic stimuli. For that though the brain spends only a tiny
fraction, around 2–10%, of its total energy budget. What hap-
pens to the rest of the energy? This raises the question for the
use and purpose of the intrinsic activity that cannot consist in
mere stimulus processing since then a higher amount of energy
would be invested into it.What does the brain do with its intrinsic
activity into which it spends so much energy? We do not know
yet. One may consider the brain’s high resting state activity as
mere noise in the background of stimulus-induced activity with
the latter being the real thing. But why then does the brain waste
so much energy and effort for mere noise? There must be more
to the brain’s resting state activity. This “more” remains unclear
though.
THE SEARCH FOR THE BRAIN’S RESTING STATE – SPATIAL
AND TEMPORAL FEATURES
How can we describe the brain’s resting state activity in further
detail? Besides the high metabolism, the resting state activity can
be characterized by strong especially low frequency ﬂuctuations
in the range between 0.1 and 0.0001Hz (see Raichle et al., 2001;
He et al., 2008; He and Raichle, 2009). While higher frequency
ﬂuctuations (1–60Hz) are certainly present in the resting state
too, they though become more accentuated during subsequent
stimulus-induced activity.
There is abundant evidence for intrinsic activity in the brain
that goes on continuously so that the brain is never really “at rest”
but shows continuously high activity. The term resting state is
consecutively used in a more operational and experimental con-
text where it is determined as the absence of speciﬁc stimuli from
the outside of the brain (see Eijsden et al., 2009; Logothetis et al.,
2009; Shulman et al., 2009; Northoff et al., 2011; Raichle, 2010;
see Appendix for more details on the conceptual issues). This is
the meaning of the term “resting state” that shall be used in the
following.
Let us look at the brain’s resting state in more detail. High
resting state activity has been observed though not only on the
cellular ormicroscopic level of the brain but also on amacroscopic
level, e.g., on the level of macroscopically identiﬁable regions. Early
studies in humans using PET identiﬁed high oxygen and glucose
consumption in the resting state in a particular set of regions
including anterior and posterior cortical midline regions like the
VMPFC, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), the differ-
ent parts (sub-, pre-, and supragenual) of the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the pre-
cuneus, as well as other regions like the lateral parietal cortex and
the hippocampus (see Raichle et al., 2001; Simpson et al., 2001;
Greicius et al., 2004). These regions have consequently been sub-
sumed under the concept of the default-mode network (DMN)
that include what has been called the cortical midline structures
(CMS; Raichle et al., 2001, see Buckner et al., 2008 and Broyd et al.,
2009 for recent reviews; see though Morcom and Flher, 2007 for a
critical view, Northoff et al., 2006).
Analogous observations were made in fMRI. During presen-
tation of external stimuli as for instance emotional or cognitive
tasks, these regions show predominantly negative signal changes
in fMRI, deactivation, or negative BOLD response (NBR) in
their neural activity whose underlying physiological mechanisms
remain unclear though. The regions showing such deactivation
or NBR during stimulation must be distinguished from those
that show activation or positive BOLD responses (PBR) in fMRI.
This has let to the distinction between task-positive regions and
task-negative regions (see below for details). While being deacti-
vated during stimulus- or task-induced activity, the regions of the
DMN show high activity and a high degree of intrinsic functional
connectivity in the resting state (Greicius et al., 2004; Beckmann
et al., 2005; Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2005; Damoiseaux et al.,
2006; Buckner et al., 2008). At the same time, the task-negative
regions of the DMN as linked by high intrinsic connectivity show
PBR and are negatively correlated, e.g., anticorrelated with the
task-positive regions during the resting state. Therefore, task-
positive and task-negative regions are not only anatomically dis-
tinguished but also functionally, i.e., in their BOLD responses and
connectivity.
Another feature of the brain’s intrinsic activity is spontaneous
ﬂuctuations in neural activity. Using electrophysiological record-
ings such as EEG, Llinas (1988) and others (Arieli et al., 1996;
Buzsaki andDraguhn,2004;Buzsaki,2006) have observed intrinsic
brain activity in the gestalt of auto-rhythmic electrical oscillations
(or synchronizations) across different brain regions, for instance
the thalamic nuclei and cortical regions.
Spontaneous signal ﬂuctuations in rather low frequency ranges
of the BOLD signal can be observed using fMRI (rather than EEG).
The spontaneous BOLD ﬂuctuations are to be found in lower fre-
quency ranges including the delta band (1–4Hz), up- and-down
states (0.8Hz) and infra-slow ﬂuctuations (ISF’s; 0.01–0.1Hz).
All three, delta, up-and-down states and ISF’s, are often subsumed
under the concept of slow cortical potentials (SCP) as they can
be measured with EEG (with a special ampliﬁer needed though).
These SCP seem to be related to the spontaneous BOLD ﬂuctua-
tions (He et al., 2008; Khader et al., 2008) with both representing
ﬂuctuations in cortical excitability across time. This in turn may
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affect the spiking activity of neurons on the cellular level as well as
activity changes on the regional level. However, it remains unclear
how spontaneous cellular activity on the level of neurons translates
into the spontaneous ﬂuctuations in (and across) regions during
the resting state (see Figure 2).
Spontaneous ﬂuctuations of neural activity as an indicator
of intrinsic activity have been observed in the regions of the
DMN, e.g., so-called task-negative regions, but also in other task-
positive regions including sensory cortices, motor cortex, insula,
and subcortical regions mirroring so-called task-positive regions
(see Freeman, 2003; Shulman et al., 2004, 2009; Hunter et al.,
2006; Wang et al., 2007; Buckner et al., 2008). Further support for
spontaneous resting state activity across the whole brain comes
from electrophysiological studies showing spontaneous neuronal
oscillations and synchronizations in various parts of the brain
including the hippocampus, the visual cortex (Llinas, 1988; Arieli
et al., 1996; Singer, 1999; Fries et al., 2001, 2007; Nase et al., 2003;
Buzsaki and Draguhn, 2004; Buzsaki, 2006). This suggests that
spontaneous ﬂuctuations and thus intrinsic activity may be preva-
lent throughout the whole brain in both humans and animals and
not be limited to the DMN.
What does the brain do in resting state? Is there a hidden light as
for instance a mind within the brain that consumes all that energy
and activity? No there is nothing but a bunch of neurons in our
brain. But these neurons themselves seem to use a lot of energy
themselves. They show high activity as high ﬁring rates with vari-
ous spikes per second already in the resting state. This suggests that
our neurons are always active, there are never at rest; even if we feel
that we do not do anything and enjoy our rest, our brain does not
seem to have the luxury of a true rest. Unlike a car whose enginewe
turn of once we no longer want to drive, the brain is continuously
active. The brain is an engine that never stops working and, unlike
the car and its engine, keeps us continuously driving which can
be observed even in sleep as for instance when we are dreaming.
We though have to be clear that currently the exact purpose of
the brain’s resting state remains unclear. Whether it serves some
adaptive purpose may be open to discussion. Moreover the neural
coding, the coding of neural activity in the resting state remains
far from clear (see Northoff, 2012).
FIGURE 2 | Characteristic features of the brain’s resting state activity.
THE SEARCH FOR CORRESPONDENCE – THE RESTING
STATE’S SPATIOTEMPORAL STRUCTURE AND THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE PSYCHIC APPARATUS
I demonstrated that the brain’s resting state activity can be charac-
terized by particular temporal, i.e., low frequency ﬂuctuations, and
spatial, i.e., functional connectivity, patterns. Taken together, this
yields a certain spatial and temporal structure, a “spatiotemporal
structure” as I name it in the following. The term spatiotemporal
structure comes close to what Fingelkurts et al. (2010) describes
as “operational space time” (OST) which he assumes to be yielded
by the brain’s resting state.
What does this spatiotemporal structure mean in more spe-
ciﬁc terms? The brain’s resting state’s spatiotemporal structure
must be regarded as a structure that is based upon the input of
all three stimuli, neuronal and intero- and exteroceptive stimuli,
and their respective spatiotemporal structures, i.e., their statistical
distributions across time and space. If they are matched and com-
pared with each other, the resulting spatiotemporal structuremust
span across brain, body, and environment thus constituting what
may be described a “virtual spatiotemporal structure.” Since the
brain’s resting state activity continuously interactswith intero- and
exteroceptive stimuli based on either past or actual stimulus–rest
interactions, the latter are integrated into the brain’s resting state
activity thereby constituting such virtual spatiotemporal structure.
In order to constitute such virtual spatiotemporal structure,
the brain bestows and imposes it upon all the stimuli it processes,
be they of neuronal, intero-, or exteroceptive origin. As such it
provides a grid, template, or schemata along whose lines all neural
activity is organized and structured. The need to assume such tem-
plate or schemata has already been nicely described by K. Lashley:
“A second point of major importance is that the nervous system
is not a neutral medium on which learning imposes any form of
organization whatsoever. On the contrary, it has deﬁnite predilec-
tions for certain forms of organization and imposes these upon the
sensory impulses which reach it. . . . In its functional organization
the nervous system seems to consist of schemata or basic patterns
within which new stimuli are ﬁtted.” (Lashley, 1949, p. 35)
Finally, wemay want to brieﬂy go into a conceptual issue.What
exactly is meant by the concept of “spatiotemporal structure?”
When I am talking of a spatiotemporal structure, I am not talking
of real space and time as measured and observed in physics. I am
rather talking of spatiotemporal structure in a virtual sense that
as such cannot be measured and observed objectively as time and
space in physics. This implies also that the spatiotemporal struc-
ture cannot be considered a mere simulation and consecutively a
representation of the physically and objectively measurable time
and space of the world.
A related issue is the exact characterization of neuronal mecha-
nisms that are supposed to underlie what is described in empirical
concepts like functional connectivity and low frequency ﬂuctua-
tions. The empirical concepts of functional connectivity and low
frequency ﬂuctuations do not describe physiological mechanisms
but rather statistical features (see also Fingelkurts, 2004; Fin-
gelkurts andKahkonen,2005 for the discussion of this issue).More
speciﬁcally, functional connectivity describes the statistically based
temporal co-variation of neural activity between different regions
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and thus across spacewhile low frequency ﬂuctuations concern the
statistical variation of neural activity across time. In short, both
empirical concepts of functional connectivity and low frequency
ﬂuctuations must be assumed to describe statistical rather than
physiological features. As such they must be regarded as synthetic
and virtual as the spatiotemporal structure they constitute.
I characterized the brain’s resting state activity by a spatiotem-
poral structure which is not real in physical terms but rather statis-
tically based, synthetic and virtual. Due to the overlap with regard
to the term“structure,” one may now be inclined to compare what
Freud described as “psychological structure” of the psychic appa-
ratus with what I here illustrated as the brain’s neural structure.
There is certainly a similarity in that both psychological struc-
ture and neural structure are not real in the physical sense but
rather virtual. And both share that they are synthetic meaning
that they are the result or product of a process that constitutes
them (with the exact nature of this constitutional process remain-
ing unclear though). Both concepts are also analogous in that they
do not target physical or psychological properties, i.e., entities but
rather a particular structure and organization. Interestingly, Freud
uses indeed the spatialization of his psychological structure when
he speak of the topological structure of the ego. He thus uses the
spatial dimension to characterize his psychological structure. In
the case of the brain, such spatial and temporal structure is even
more direct, and, to be more precise, the brain’s neural structure
is by itself deﬁned in spatial and temporal terms.
In sum, one may assume correspondence between Freud’s
approach to the psychic apparatus in terms of psychological struc-
ture and the view on the brain and its resting state’s intrinsic
spatiotemporal structure. The question is now whether and if so
how both are related to each other since that would provide an
answer to whether Freudwould embrace neuropsychoanalysis and
why he abandoned neuroscience at this time.
THE SEARCH FOR NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT
CONDITIONS – “NEURAL CORRELATES” VERSUS “NEURAL
PREDISPOSITIONS”
Let me venture brieﬂy into current neuroscience. One of the
main ﬁelds in neuroscience these days is the search for the neu-
ronalmechanismsunderlying consciousness. This is described and
subsumed under the heading of neural correlates of conscious-
ness (NCC; Koch, 2004). The NCC aims to identify the neuronal
mechanisms that are sufﬁcient to induce consciousness. Thereby
it aims to describe the relationship of consciousness to speciﬁc
psychological functions like attention, working memory, as well
as how consciousness is related to the neural activity in speciﬁc
brain regions (see Koch, 2004; Northoff, 2011). The function- and
localization-based approach is thus well prevalent in the NCC
(though admittedly in a somehow modiﬁed form; see Northoff,
2011 for details).
Analogously to the case of consciousness and the NCC, cur-
rent neuropsychoanalysis also aims to search for the sufﬁcient
neural conditions of speciﬁc psychodynamic mechanisms. This
is for instance the case when Solms locates early defense mech-
anisms like introjections and other forms of internalization with
the region of the VMPFC. Hence, analogous to the NCC, one may
want to speak of what I call “neural correlates of psychodynamics”
(NCP). The NCP shares with the NCC the focus on the sufﬁcient
neural conditions as well as (the rather implicit presupposition of)
a function- and localization-based approach. There is one crucial
difference though. Instead of being restricted to consciousness as
the NCC, neuropsychoanalysis targets both conscious and uncon-
scious states. TheNCPdo consequently cover amore extensive ter-
ritory, e.g., consciousness and unconsciousness, when compared
to the NCC and its exclusive focus on consciousness.
The NCP focus on the sufﬁcient neural conditions of the psy-
chological functions Freud described. How about their necessary
neural conditions? We recall. Freud extended and complemented
psychological functions by his search for psychological structure
and organization and thus by a structure-based approach. Instead
of sufﬁcient conditions, psychological structure and organization
concern the necessary but non-sufﬁcient conditions of mental
contents. How can we extend the psychological structure and
organization to the brain? The mere neural correlates, the NCP,
are not appropriate since they refer only to the sufﬁcient but not
the necessary conditions. We instead need to target those neural
conditions that are necessary but non-sufﬁcient by themselves.
Since those neural conditions may enable and predispose the psy-
chological functions and mental contents, I here speak of “neural
predisposition.”
Let us determine the concept of neural predispositions in more
detail. The concept of neural predispositions describes the nec-
essary but non-sufﬁcient conditions provided by the brain itself;
these conditions are supposed to enable and predispose psycho-
logical functions and their respective mental contents. One may
consequently want to speak of what I call “neural predispositions
of psychodynamics” (NPP) that refer to the necessary but non-
sufﬁcient, e.g., enabling and predisposing neural conditions of
mental contents as described in psychodynamic concepts. As such
the NPP must be distinguished from the NCP that refer to the
sufﬁcient but non-necessary, e.g., operating and executing, con-
ditions of the mental contents as referred to in psychodynamic
concepts.
After having charted out the conceptual territory, we now
ﬁnally can turn to the empirical grounds of the brain. What do
neural predispositions and thus NPP refer to in terms of empir-
ical brain function? While the neural correlates and the NCP as
being function- and localization-based can be associated with the
neural activity in speciﬁc brain regions, this remains unclear so
far in the case of the neural predispositions. I suggest that for that
we have to go back to the brain itself and its intrinsic features and
more speciﬁcally to its resting state activity and its spatiotemporal
structure.
What does the brain do with this high level of resting state
activity? One may consider the brain’s high resting state activity as
mere noise in the background of stimulus-induced activity with
the latter being the real thing. But why then does the brain waste so
much energy and effort for mere noise? There must bemore to the
brain’s resting state activity. This “more” remains unclear though
currently. If there is “more” to the brain’s resting state activity than
mere noise, it must somehow affect stimulus-induced activity with
the latter being dependent upon the former. Hence there must be
what in the following I will call “rest–stimulus interaction” (see
Northoff et al., 2010 for an overview). While the exact neuronal
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mechanisms making such rest–stimulus interaction possible are
unclear, there is at least empirical evidence for such interaction.
Recent studies do indeed lend empirical support to such rest–
stimulus interaction. Maandag et al. (2007) for instance manip-
ulated the resting state activity level in rats with anesthetic drugs
and investigated their neural activity changes during subsequent
execution of similar movements. The different resting state levels
lead to different neuronal activity patterns in the cortex dur-
ing the subsequent movement with some regions being active
only during a speciﬁc resting state activity level and others being
recruited in another one. Human studies showed that the degree
of stimulus-induced activity in the perigenual anterior cingulate
and the visual cortex is dependent upon the resting state concen-
tration of GABA in the very same regions (Northoff et al., 2007b;
Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2009; see also Boly et al., 2007 for
another example and Northoff, 2011 for a review).
In addition to such rest–stimulus interaction, there is also
reverse trafﬁc with stimulus-induced activity impacting andmod-
ulating subsequent resting state activity amounting to what I
call “stimulus–rest interaction.” Lewis et al. (2009) for instance
demonstrated that visuospatial learning did not only lead to acti-
vation changes in the visual cortex but also to connectivity changes
of that region with DMN regions during the subsequent resting
state (See Northoff et al., 2010 for review). Similar observations
were made in studies on working memory and self-relatedness.
Higher degrees of working memory and self-relatedness lead to
stronger connectivity and activity changes within the DMN in
subsequent resting state periods when compared to lower degrees
of working memory and self-relatedness (Schneider et al., 2008;
Pyka et al., 2009).
What do these examples tell us about the brain and its involve-
ment in speciﬁc cognitive, affective or social functions as described
by particular psychodynamic concepts and localized in speciﬁc
brain regions? When investigating the brain’s resting state activity
and how it impacts stimulus-induced activity (and consequently
psychological functions; see also Northoff et al., 2010 for a recent
review), we focus on the necessary but non-sufﬁcient conditions
and thus on those neural conditions that enable and predispose
psychological functions and their respectively associated mental
contents. One may then describe the brain’s resting state activity
and its impact on subsequent stimulus-induced activity as nec-
essary but non-sufﬁcient conditions and hence as enabling and
predisposing rather than executing and operating conditions. In
other terms, the investigation of the brain’s resting state activ-
ity may give us a glimpse into what I above described as “neural
predisposition” as distinguished from mere neural correlates. We
though have to be clear that currently we do not know the exact
neuronal mechanisms that may predispose the resting state and its
spatiotemporal structure to generate consciousness (see Northoff,
2012).
THE SEARCH FOR THE LINKAGE – “NEURAL
PREDISPOSITIONS” AS NECESSARY CONDITION OF
“PSYCHOLOGICAL PREDISPOSITIONS”
How does all that relate to Freud? In the same way that the
brain’s resting state activity is a neural predisposition for sub-
sequent stimulus-induced activity, Freud assumes that the ego’s
psychological structure provides the psychological predisposition
for various psychological functions ranging from sexual drive to
memory. Hence, Freud was very much interested in what may
be described as “psychological predispositions,” the necessary but
non-sufﬁcient conditions of psychological functions.
This raises the question howboth neural and psychological pre-
dispositions are related to each other. One may now be inclined to
argue that the resting state’s spatiotemporal structure may be cen-
tral and thus necessary and predispositional for constituting what
Freud described as psychological structure. This would mean to
link Freud’s psychological structure to the spatial and temporal
features characterizing the resting state’s neural structure. While
this is certainly a research project for the future, it would make
possible an intrinsic linkage between neural and psychological
structures andultimately betweenbrain andpsychic apparatus and
hence between neuroscience and psychoanalysis (see Figure 3).
Let us get back to our starting point.We were asking why Freud
abandoned neuroscience after his 1895 Project writing and shifted
from the brain to the psychic apparatus. Based on his primary
interest in the psychological structure and organization of the
psychic apparatus, he could not ﬁnd any analogous approach to
the brain at this time. All he could ﬁnd was a focus on particu-
lar regions and functions and thus a region- and function-based
approach to the brain. This amounted to a rather extrinsic view
on the brain that focused more on how stimuli are processed in
the brain rather than on the brain itself and its intrinsic features
independent of the stimuli. Hence, he remained unable to detect
and see the brain’s intrinsic neural structure which would have
complemented his search for the psychological structure within
the neural context of the brain. Rather than searching for some-
thing that, for him at his time, did not seem to exist, he preferred to
develop the psychological structure in more detail thus venturing
into psychoanalysis while abandoning neuroscience.
What can we learn from this today? Besides the extrinsic
approach to the brain,we should also develop amore intrinsic view
on the brain and its intrinsic features. This will allow us to reveal
the brain’s neural structure which I here assumed to be a “virtual”
FIGURE 3 | “Neural correlates” versus “neural predispositions.”
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statistically based spatiotemporal structure. Such spatiotemporal
structure may be the neural predisposition not only for any kind
of stimulus-induced activity but possibly also for the constitution
of what Freud described as “psychological structure and organi-
zation” which he attributed to the psychic apparatus. And since
the psychic apparatus’ psychological structure is the psychologi-
cal predisposition of various psychodynamic processes, the resting
state’s spatiotemporal structure may be (indirectly via the psycho-
logical structure) related and linked to the latter. We will then be
able to develop what I described as the NPP and thereby to com-
plement what Freud abandoned to do after 1895 (see Northoff,
2011 for details).
IMPLICATIONS
While the focus of this paper on Freud and the brain, I want to at
least brieﬂy indicate some of the implications of my resting state-
based approach. For that I brieﬂy discuss the examples of self/ego,
dreams, cathexis, and depression.
The concepts of the self and ego are often taken in a substan-
tial way as based on the concept of mind. Freud rejected such
substance-based concept of the ego when is introduced his struc-
tural model. Empirically, such structural model implies that we
may not be able to ﬁnd a particular region to be speciﬁcally and
exclusively associated with the functions of the ego and the ego
itself Freud described. Instead of searching for the self-region
or self-network in the brain, one may rather want to look for
basic organizational and structural principles. More speciﬁcally,
the here suggested spatiotemporal structure of the resting state
may provide the starting point for such organizational principle.
If being associated with the self or the ego, one would expect
the organization of the resting state’s spatiotemporal structure to
somehow ingrain self-speciﬁc and thus to reﬂect the structure of
the ego. This though would require muchmore extensive elabora-
tion which is beyond the scope of this paper though (see Northoff,
2012).
Another examples are dreams. Dreams occur in the resting state
activity of the brain. This raises the question how the thoughts,
perceptions, and sense of self and ego are generated during the
dream. Usually we associate those experiences with stimulus-
induced activity. However, the fact that they can already occur
in dreams indicates that the resting state activity by itself is princi-
pally able to generate dreams and ultimately consciousness. How is
this possible? For that we need to shed a more detailed light on the
speciﬁc organization of the resting state’s spatiotemporal structure
as indicated in the context of the self. More speciﬁcally, we may
need to target the exact neuronal mechanisms of rest–rest inter-
action that seem to simulate some of the kind of neural activity
that occurs during rest–stimulus interaction (see Northoff, 2011
for details). How such rest–rest and rest–stimulus interaction is
related to consciousness remains unclear though at present (see
Northoff, 2012).
Another interesting psychodynamic concept that appears in a
new light is the one of cathexis. Freud introduced the term cathexis
to describe psychic energy. The question is now whether there is
a corresponding function and thus concept on the neuronal side.
Lets recall. The brain spends 80% of its energy and metabolism
already in the resting state while the stimulus-induced activity
requires only small incremental increases in the energy supply.
What does the brain do with all the energy? I here tentatively
assumed that it constitutes a spatiotemporal structure. The exact
neuronal mechanisms and its purpose remain unclear though (see
Northoff, 2012). What is clear though is that the resting state may
hold the key to ﬁnd a neuronal analogon to what Freud described
as cathexis on the psychological level.
Finally, one may want to point some clinical implication for
depression. Depression can be characterized by abnormally high
resting state activity in especially themidline regions (seeNorthoff,
2011). This may lead to an abnormally increased self-focus which
in turn may abnormally ﬁlter all subsequent stimulus-induced
activity and their related affective and cognitive functions. One
question in this context may also be how the resting state’s spa-
tiotemporal structure and its alterations may be mirrored in and
correspond to the changes in the spatial and temporal features of
the patients’ consciousness of themselves and the world including
of time and space. That though requires a much more detailed
phenomenological in-depth analysis and a corresponding neuro-
scientiﬁc investigation.While this is subject of future investigation,
it makes clear that the resting state-based approach as proposed
here leads to novel pathways in understanding (and also treating)
psychiatric disorders like depression.
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